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Abstract
This paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers dur-
ing scal stabilizations in OECD countries over the last two decades. We nd
that debt maturity tends to lengthen the more credible is the program, the
lower is the long-term interest rate and the higher is the volatility of short-
term interest rates. We show that this debt issuing strategy is consistent with
optimal debt management if information bewteen the government and private
investors is asymmetric, as it is usually the case at the outset of a stabiliza-
tion attempt when private investors may lack full condence in the announced
budget cuts.
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1. Introduction
This paper presents evidence on how governments manage their public debt dur-
ing a scal stabilization. We study 62 episodes of scal correction occurred in OECD
countries between 1975 and 1995, and analyze the government issuing strategy during
the rst two years of each program. The empirical evidence shows that governments,
at the start of a stabilization, increase the share of xed-rate long-term debt de-
nominated in the domestic currency the more credible is the program, the lower are
long-term interest rates, and the higher is the risk associated with rolling over short-
term debt. This evidence points to a trade-o between roll-over risk and the cost of
debt servicing that is well known to debt managers (see e.g. H.M. Treasury and Bank
of England, 1995).
Issuing short-term debt to be rolled over in the future exposes the government
budget to the eects of interest rate shocks. Optimal taxation suggests issuing long-
dated securities in order to insulate the budget from such shocks, thus allowing for
smoother tax rates (see Barro, 1995). Although this policy may be costly, it is always
optimal for the government to insure against interest-rate risk (when this is the only
source of uncertainty) provided long-term interest rates reect properly called term
premia and not time consistency problems or market imperfections. However, when
the government and private investors do not share the same information, high interest
rates on long-term bonds may reect credibility problems other than term premia,
which provides a theoretical justication for a policy aimed at reducing the cost of
debt servicing. Asymmetric information plays a crucial role at the outset of a stabi-
lization: as the government's resolution to carry out the program is not known to the
private sector, long interest rates may remain high until the time when the uncer-
tainty as to the outcome of the stabilization is resolved. In this situation, as noted by
Campbell (1995), a committed government may reduce the cost of debt servicing by
issuing short-term debt. This policy can yield additional benets to the extent that
the decison to issue short, or indexed or foreign currency debt, signals to the market
the government's intentions: by shortening debt maturity committed governments
may distinguish themselves from less determined ones. Episodes of scal stabiliza-
tions can thus provide valuable information on the determinants of government debt
issuing policy.
The evidence presented in Section 2 shows that the credibility of a program, as
measured by the change in long-term interest rates at the start of the stabilization, and
the roll-over risk, as measured by the conditional volatility of short-term interest rates,
are important determinants of the choice of debt instruments in scal stabilizations.
Credibility and interest-rate risk tend to increase the share of xed-rate long-term
debt, while a higher level of the long-term interest rate reduces it.
These stylized facts motivate the models presented in the next two sections. The
model of Section 3 describes the choice of debt maturity |when the authorities and
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the private sector share the same information| by a government which is attempting
to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio through tax levies and spending cuts. We show
that a government which expects to be successful will always issue long-term bonds
to protect itself against the possibility that the stabilization may fail as a result of an
exogenous interest rate shock; such a protection can be obtained by predetermining
the cost of borrowing through the issue of long-term bonds. Under full information,
only a government which expects to fail will issue short-term debt: as it is unable to
cut spending, its only hope is to be \saved" by a favourable shock to future interest
rates.
Asymmetric information is introduced in Section 4. If the government's resolution
to carry out the stabilization is not fully credible, interest rates on long-term debt
will be high reecting investors' lack of condence. In this case the government may
want to issue short-term debt and wait until the uncertainty about the outcome of
the stabilization is resolved. By issuing short-term debt the government may also
signal its resolution. We formalize this intuition (Campbell, 1995) considering a
reputation game between two governments which are both expected to succeed but,
being characterized by dierent spending cuts, would face dierent interest rates
under full information. Because spending cuts require time to be implemented, the
private sector must form expectations about future interest rates, and look at the
government issuing policy as a signal of its resolve in implementing the cuts. We
show that a separating equilibrium exists where the \tough" government shortens
debt maturity to signal its determination. The separating maturity is decreasing in
the level of the long-term interest rate, and increasing in the variability of interest
rates, consistently with our empirical ndings.
2. Debt maturity and scal stabilizations: the evidence
We consider the scal stabilization episodes which took place in OECD countries
between 1975 and 1995. Fiscal stabilizations can provide valuable information on
the determinants of debt management decisions because, during such episodes, the
authorities' assessments of the probability of success are likely to dier from those
of the private sector, and so will the expectations of interest rates. Thus, long-term
interest rates will reect credibility problems other than term premia which makes
it possible for the government to reduce the cost of debt servicing by issuing short
maturity, or foreign currency, or variable-rate debt.
We identify stabilization episodes from the OECD estimates of the general gov-
ernment's primary structural budget surplus |that is, the cyclically adjusted budget
surplus net of interest payments. An episode of scal stabilization is dened as a
period, lasting one or more years, during which the structural primary surplus has
improved by at least 1 percent of GDP. This denition is intended to capture rela-
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tively important changes in the discretionary component of the budget. By excluding
small improvements |that is those between 0 and 1 percent of GDP, there are 7 of
such episodes in our sample| we may lose evidence from unsuccesful attempts, but
we avoid the risk of including improvements in the budget surplus which occur by
chance or, even worse, because of the exhaustion of temporary expansionary scal
measures.
There have been 68 of such episodes from 1975 to 1995 in the following OECD
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
UK and USA. Our sample reduces to 62 episodes because of the lack of information re-
garding the debt composition of Greece and Norway and because of the unavailability
of data on interest rates for the Spanish episode of 1975.
These episodes are listed in Table 1. The sample includes well-known examples of
scal consolidations, such as Denmark in 1983-86, Ireland in 1982-83, and then again
in 1986-89, Sweden in 1986-87, and so on. Some of these consolidations turned out
to be successful, in the sense that the debt-to-GDP ratio was stabilized (such as in
Ireland, in 1986-89); others instead failed (such as in Ireland again in 1982-83).
For each episode we look at the two-year change in the share of long-term debt,
between the end of the year preceding the stabilization and the end of the second
year of the stabilization (we have this information only once-a-year, on December
31st). Long-term debt is dened as the sum of xed-rate government bonds and loans
denominated in the domestic currency with an initial maturity longer than two years.
We thus consider debt denominated in foreign currency and bonds whose coupon is
indexed to market interest rates or to the price level as short-term debt (See Data
Appendix). The composition of the public debt in various countries was obtained
from national sources. Public debt includes the holdings of debt by the monetary
authorities because we have information on the composition of such holdings only for
a subset of countries. Experimenting with dierent denitions of long-term debt, in
particular excluding loans and savings certicates, or limiting the attention to debt
held by the private sector, where possible, or shows that our results are robust to
alternative denitions.
As discussed in the introduction, theory points to three factors inuencing the
government's choice of debt maturity at the start of a stabilization: the roll-over risk,
the level of the interest rates and the credibility of the government. The roll-over
risk is related to the conditional volatility of short-term interest rates: we measure
this variability by the coecient of variation (standard error divided by the mean) of
short-term interest rates in the seven-year period preceding the stabilization attempt.
The standard error is estimated from the auxilliary regression (on quarterly data) of
the short-term interest rate on its rst lag and the rst lag of the long rate. Data on
interest rates are taken from the OECD whenever available, otherwise from IMF-IFS.
Measuring the credibility of a stabilization program is dicult. Ideally, one would
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like to know how credible is the program from the start, say, at the time it is an-
nounced and before the maturity is chosen. Realistically, we have to rely on an ex-post
measure of credibility. We measure the credibility of the stabilization attempt by the
fall in the spread between the yield on long-term government bonds in the country
considered and German bonds. Thus, we identify as credible an attempt which leads
to a fall in the long interest rate relative to the German rate. (We assume German
policies to be fully credible). The change in the long spread that we consider is that
occurring in the rst year of the stabilization.
The literature on debt management also suggests the debt-to-GDP ratio as a
factor inuencing the decision about the type of debt instruments a government issues:
Missale-Blanchard (1994) provide evidence of a negative relation between the debt
level and debt maturity. We have thus also looked at the debt-GDP ratio at the start
of the stabilization.
No clear pattern in the choice of debt maturity emerges from Table 1. While on
average debt maturity lengthens, the number of episodes where the opposite happens
appear to be equally important. One way to summarize this evidence is to split the
sample between those episodes which have been accompanied by a lengthening of
debt maturity, and those where the opposite has happened. This is shown in the rst
two columns of Table 2 which report simple means (of the dierent variables) for the
two sub-samples.
The average increase in the share of xed rate long-term debt has been 4.9 percent
in the 36 episodes where this has happened, while a comparable 5.1 percent fall is
observed in the 26 episodes where maturity has shortened. Interestingly, the two
sub-samples show the same conditional volatility in short-term interest rates and an
average initial long-term interest rate which diers by only 7 basis points. Episodes
in which the maturity lengthened dier from episodes in which it shortened because
of a higher debt-to-GDP ratio and a lower initial share of long-term debt. More
importantly, the former episodes appear to have enjoyed a greater initial credibility
as shown by the 1.11 percent fall in the long spread on German rate relative to the
episodes in which the maturity shortened, where, on average, the long rate rose in
the rst year of the stabilization attempt. To further investigate the possibility that
credible stabilization attempts are associated with issuance of long instead of short-
term debt, we have also divided our sample in two parts, depending on whether the
long rate has fallen or increased vis-a-vis the German rate. As shown in the last two
columns of Table 2, the number of episodes in each group is about the same. In the
30 cases of a falling long rate |which we tentatively call credible stabilizations| the
share of long-term debt has increased while the opposite has happened in episodes of
rising interest rates. \Credible" stabilizations show a 4.9 percent higher mean change
of the share of long debt in spite of their worse initial conditions in terms of interest
rates, debt levels, and debt maturity.
The evidence provided so far has been descriptive. In order to examine whether
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credibility, i.e. the change in the long spread, the initial level of interest rates and the
roll-over risk have a signicant impact on the choice of debt maturity, we have run a
simple OLS regression. The dependent variable is the 2 year change in the share of
xed-rate long-term debt. On the right-hand-side we have a constant, the standard
error (divided by the mean) of short-term interest rates, the long interest rate the year
before the stabilization, the change in the spread of long rates vis-a-vis long German
bonds, and the debt-to-GDP ratio. We also include the share of long-term debt at
the start of the stabilization, since it can make a big dierence if the government
starts o with, say, 80 percent of long debt, or only 5 percent.
The results reported in Table 3 show that credible scal stabilizations are accom-
panied by a lengthening of debt maturity. When the full sample is considered, in
column 1, the coecient of the change in the long rate spread is positive and signif-
icant at the 5% level. The level of long interest rates is also an important factor in
the choice of debt maturity. High long rates lead governments to issue short-term
(or variable rate or foreign-currency) debt to avoid being locked into costly debt con-
tracts. The coecient of the standard error of short rates, though positive as theory
suggests, is not precisely estimated; it is not signicant at the 10% level. While the
level of debt appears not to aect the choice of the debt to issue, there is clear evi-
dence that lengthening maturity is easier when maturity is short at the beginning of
the stabilization.
In column 2 we show the results obtained including a dummy for the 1990s. This
should capture the lengthening in debt maturity that occurred in many countries
after the liberalization of nancial markets and the emergence of liquid markets for
long-term government bonds denominated in the domestic currency. Although the
dummy variable is not signicant, in this regression the coecient of the standard
error of short-term rates is signicant at the 10% level. Finally, in all regressions
a standard Jarque-Bera test does not reject the hypothesis that the residuals are
normally distributed.
Both the long interest rate and the change in spread are strongly signicant: as
argued in the introduction, and shown more formally in the following sections, a
government will only issue short-term debt if it faces a high term premium on long
rates, reecting investors' lack of condence in the stabilization. When a stabilization
gains credibility from the outset, as reected in a fall of the spread, the government
will issue long.
In the last two columns of Table 3 we ask whether or not the eects detected so far
are equally present in all the stabilization episodes, independently of the magnitude of
the scal adjustment. To this end we divide episodes in two sub-samples. We examine
in column 3 episodes in which the scal adjustment has been relatively small, and,
in column 4, episodes in which the magnitude of the adjustment has been larger.
The median adjustment used to divide the sample happens to be 2.5% of GDP. The
outcome of this simple characterization is interesting: except for the initial maturity,
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none of the coecients in the sample of minor stabilization episodes is signicant at
the 5% level, and only the coecient on the long-term interest rate is signicant at
the 10% level. Credibility and long rates appear to play a signicant role in the choice
of debt maturity only in episodes of relatively large scal adjustment.
In Tables 4 and 5 we also present evidence for stabilizations with a total scal
adjustment greater or equal to 2% of GDP. We have no good excuse for choosing
the 2% cut-o point, except that any such choice would be arbitrary, and lowering
the cut-o point to 2% allows us to consider twelve more episodes. The only result
that changes in the new sample is the coecient on the conditional volatility of short
rates, which is now signicant at the 5% level (seee Table 4, column 1).
In Column 2 of Table 4 we examine the implications of making our denition of
stabilization more restrictive along the time dimension. We consider only episodes
which last no less than 2 years, as we may want to capture scal consolidation which
are signicant because of the consistent change in the discretionary component of the
budget decit, in addition to their overall magnitude. This experiment leads to the
same results obtained on the broader sample including 1-year episodes but excluding
scal corrections lower than 2% of GDP.
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In the last two columns of Table 4 we provide evidence on an alternative speci-
cation for the choice of debt maturity. Conventional wisdom suggests that the spread
between long and short-term rates |the slope of the yield curve| not only conveys
useful information about the path for future interest rates but also captures term
premia or \unjustied" ination expectations to which debt managers may want to
react. The slope of the yield curve and its change could thus better explain the be-
havior of debt maturity during stabilization attempts than the level and the change
(relative to German rates) in the long interest rate. We have explored this idea by
adding to the regressors the spread between the long and the short interest rate in
the year preceding the stabilization and (the negative of) its change in the rst year
of the stabilization. Results are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 for the full sam-
ple and the restricted sample, respectively, and are surprising. Not only do the long
interest rate and its change (relative to the German rate) outperform the yield slope
and its change as explanatory variable, but their coecient are unaected by the
inclusion of the new regressors. Contrary to what could be expected, a high spread
between long and short interest rates |once one controls for the level of the long
interest rate| is associated with an increase in the share of long-term debt. A fall in
the long-short spread also leads to a shortening of debt maturity. In the full-sample
regression such eects are statistically signicant at the 5% and 10% levels. This
evidence could be explained by the inability of yearly data to capture movements in
the yield curve, or even by the non homogeneity of short interest rate in the OECD
data-base. An alternative explanation is that stabilization episodes are often accom-
1
When attention is restricted to consolidations longer than 1 year, the volatility of short interest
rates is signicant also for episodes exhibiting a correction greater than 2.5% of GDP.
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panied by a tightening of monetary policy which raises short rates above long-term
rates. In such instances the yield slope becomes negative, and the credibility of the
stabilization attempt can only be inferred from the behavior of the long interest rate.
Only the fall of such rate below its pre-stabilization level, rather than the twist in the
yield curve, is a sign that the stabilization is credible.
What matters for the choice of debt maturity is thus the level of the long rate,
rather than its position relative to the short rate. A government facing high short
and long interest rates, with short rates higher than long rates, may well prefer to
borrow short if it is condent that high long rates are only temporary and will fall as
the program is carried out and credibility is gained. The model we present in Section
4 develops this intuition.
Finally, we ask whether our estimates could suer from an endogeneity problem.
As we measure the credibility of the stabilization by the fall in the interest rate during
the rst year of the program, there is a potential for this variable to be aected by the
choice of type of debt that the government issues at the outset of the stabilization.
The choice of a particular debt instrument may convey private information about
the prospects of the stabilization attempt, and may thus aect private investors'
expectations and thus interest rates. To take care of the possible endogeneity of the
change in long interest rates vis-a-vis German rates, we use, as an instrument, the
change in such variable occurring in the six month preceding the rst year of the
stabilization, and thus the choice of debt maturity. Instrumental variable estimates
are shown in Table 5 for both the full and the restricted samples and for both the
specications excluding and including the slope of the yield curve and its change. This
latter variable has also been instrumented with its value in the six months preceding
the stabilization attempt.
The instrumental variable regressions conrm earlier results. Although, the coe-
cient for the change in the long interest rate spread is greater than the corresponding
OLS coecient, a formal Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis that such vari-
able is exogenous to the choice of debt maturity at the 10% and 5% signicance levels
for the full sample and the restricted sample respectively.
2
3. The choice of debt maturity: likely and unlikely stabilizers
A main nding of the preceding analysis is that stabilizations which are credible
from the outset are accompanied by a lengthening of debt maturity. In this section
we provide a tentative explanation of this fact based on the idea that a government
with favorable stabilization prospects will issue long-term debt to protect its eorts
2
When we focus, pherhaps less arbitrarily, on stabilizations with a scal correction greater than
the median of 2.5% of GDP, the same results are obtained except for the fact that the volatility of
short rates is no longer signicant.
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from being jeopardized by an adverse shock to interest rates.
We describe the choice of debt maturity in a situation where the government and
the private sector share the same information. Within this framework, credibility
refers to the probability of success of the stabilization itself, as opposed to the credi-
bility of the policymaker (Dornbusch 1991, Drazen-Masson 1994). We shall compare
the choice of debt maturity by a government which is credible in the sense that it
is expected to succeed |the \likely" stabilizer| with one which is expected to fail
|the \unlikely" stabilizer.
The aim of both governments is to halt the rising debt-to-GDP ratio by cutting
public spending and levying taxes. The relevant time-horizon extends over two peri-
ods: period 0 and period 1. The sequence of events, summarized in Figure 1, is as
follows. At the beginning of period 0, the government rolls over the stock of public
debt and has two options: it can either issue two-period bonds, or one-period bonds
maturing at the beginning of period 1. We describe this choice through the parameter
m: the share of long-term debt. When m = 1, the government issues only two-period
bonds; when m = 0, only one-period bonds. At the beginning of period 0, the one-
period interest rate during period 0 is known. For the ease of notation we assume
such interest rate equal to zero. The one-period interest rate, i, which will prevail
in period 1, is instead uncertain; it depends on external circumstances. We denote
the expectation of i at the beginning of period 0 as E
0
i, |i.e. E
0
i is the forward
rate|. Government spending, G, is observed by private investors at the end of period
0 before the debt is rolled over (an assumption which will play a relevant role only in
the next section under asymmetric information). The uncertainty about the period-1
interest rate is resolved at the beginning of period 1 before the one-period bonds are
rolled over. When taxes are set the only remaining source of uncertainty arises from
an exogenous shock, X, which hits the government budget at the end of period 1.
We assume that the distribution of the shock X is triangular with mean zero and a
support ranging between  a and a.
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The government sets taxes at the beginning of period 1, after observing i but before
X realizes. Raising taxes is increasingly costly, say, because taxes are distortionary.
Their level is chosen so as to minimize the loss, L, from tax costs and the expected
costs of failure
L =
1
2
T
2
+ pK
where T denotes taxes, p is the probability that the stabilization fails, and K is the
xed cost of failure relative to the cost of tax distortions.
4
The probability that the
stabilization fails, i.e. that the debt, B, increases, B = X +G + I   T > 0, is the
3
As it will become clear later on, only the algebra, but not the substance, of our results changes
if the distribution of X were not truncated, for example if X were normally distributed.
4
For a similar specication of the government problem in the context of exchange rate stabilization
see Dornbusch (1991).
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probability that an adverse shock to the budget, X, exceeds the planned surplus
p = Prob[X > T  G  I]
where G is the level of public spending, and I, the cost of debt service, is
I  (1 m)i+mE
0
i
where the stock of debt inherited at the beginning of period 0 is normalized to 1.
Thus, (1   m) is the share of debt nanced, at the beginning of period 0, by one-
period bonds which need to be rolled-over at the interest rate, i, prevailing in period
1. m is the share of two-period bonds issued at the beginning of period 0, which bear
a long-term interest rate, E
0
i (equal to the forward rate).
Consider rst the choice of taxes and debt maturity by a government whose de-
termination at cutting spending is publicly known and whose program is expected to
succeed. A \likely" stabilizer can be thought as being characterized either by a high
cost of failure, K, relative to a
2
or by a low level of public spending in period 1: we
call this level G
L
. Such a government is expected to succeed in the sense that for
X = E
0
X = 0 (and for its choice of taxes, T

) the overall budget shows a surplus:
T

 G
L
  I > 0 |it could fail only if hit by a \very large" realization of X.
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Since the planned surplus   T

 G
L
  I is positive, as in Figure 1, the proba-
bility of failure is lower than one half and is derived using the right-hand side of the
triangular distribution of X, as
p = Prob[X > T  G
L
  I] =
1
2a
2
(a+G
L
+ I   T )
2
Replacing p in the government loss function yields the loss that the government ex-
pects before knowing the realization of X, but after having observed period-1 interest
rates and thus I:
L =
K
2a
2
(a+G
L
+ I   T )
2
+
1
2
T
2
Deriving L with respect to T , we obtain the optimal value of taxes:
T

= (a+G
L
+ I) where 0 <  
K
a
2
+K
< 1
which is increasing in public spending and in the cost of debt service.
We now turn to the choice of m. Substituting T

in the loss function and taking
expectations conditional on the information at time 0, yields the expected value of
the loss function, L

, as of the beginning of period 0:
E
0
L

= E
0

2
[a+G
L
+ I]
2
= E
0

2
[a+G
L
+ (1 m)i+mE
0
i]
2
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We shall indicate in a moment the conditions on the values of the parameters K, a and G
which ensure a positive planned surplus. The support of the distribution of i must also be bounded
from above to rule out the possibility that the surplus turns out to be negative because of a large
realization of I.
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Since L

is a convex function of total spending, its expected value is minimized by
setting m = 1: the government only issues two-period bonds. This choice mimimizes
the variance of total spending by eliminating all the uncertainty related to the cost of
debt servicing. In other words, the government|because on average it is successful|
is unwilling to take bets on interest rates. For a given variance of period-1 interest
rates, the smaller the value of m (the larger the amount of debt to be rolled over), the
higher is the probability that the stabilization will fail, because a negative interest
rate shock increases the probability of failure by a larger amount than a positive shock
reduces it.
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The idea that long maturity debt helps to avoid renancing risk and thus allows
to smooth tax rates is a well established result in the literature on debt management
(Barro 1995). By reducing the exposure of the government budget to interest-rate
risk, long-term debt also prevents the emergence of self-fullling crises or speculative
attacks (Calvo 1988, Alesina-Prati-Tabellini 1990 and Giavazzi-Pagano 1990). Within
the present framework, the optimality of long-term debt also arises quite naturally,
but for a dierent reason: long-term debt is optimal not only because it reduces tax
distortions but because it increases the probability of success. This eect adds to
the traditional argument in the stabilization literature that long-term nominal debt
enlarges the ination-tax base and thus leads to a lower equilibrium ination in the
event that the stabilization fails (Calvo-Guidotti 1990, Guidotti-Kumar 1991).
However, for our explanation to be complete, we must also show that governments
with little chances to succeed nd it optimal to issue short-term debt. In what follows
we show that a government which expects to fail issues short-term debt: as it is unable
to cut spending, its only hope is to be \saved" by a favourable shock to interest rates.
We refer to such a government as the \unlikely" stabilizer and, accordingly, denote
its level of spending in period 1 by G
U
. The unlikely stabilizer carries out minor
spending cuts; its planned surplus (its surplus in the absence of shocks) is negative,
T

 G
U
  I < 0, so that it will not stabilize the debt except for unusually favorable
realizations of X.
Why such a government would not aim at a higher level of taxes so as improve its
chances of success? Within our model this happens if both the cost of failure is low
relative to budget uncertainty (to the variance of X) and if the level of spending is
high. Formally, the government nds it optimal to choose a level of taxes, T

, such
that T

 G
U
  I < 0 if (and only if) K < a
2
and G
U
+ I > K=a.
7
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This is because, in the region we are considering, the probability density function is downward
sloping.
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The proof of such claim is straightforward but lengthy; it requires to compare local minima
obtained for alternative intervals of T ; those for which the left-hand side and those for which the
right-hand side of the triangular distribution of X applies. A possible complication is that interior
minima may not exist because of the concavity of the loss function. Finally, to ensure that the
surplus is negative for all realization of i, the support of its distribution must have a lower bound i
which satises G
U
+ i > K=a. (Simmetrically, the condition G
L
+

i < K=a on the upper bound of
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As in Figure 3, the critical value of X now lies to the left of the origin, i.e.
  T

 G
U
  I < 0. It follows that the probability of failure is
p = 1  
1
2a
a
(a+ T  G
U
  I)
2
and that the optimal value of taxes is equal to
T

= [a G
U
  I] where  
K
a
2
 K
> 0
and is decreasing in total spending. The reason why taxes fall as G
U
increases is that,
when the variance of the shock is large, i.e. when a
2
> K, the marginal benet from
an increase in taxes is relatively small, because it raises the probability of success by
a relatively small amount while its marginal cost is high relative the cost of failure.
Consider now the choice of debt maturity. The loss as expected at the beginning
of period 0, when the government chooses the maturity of the debt, is
E
0
L

= K  

2
E
0
[a G
U
  I]
2
= K  

2
E
0
[a G
U
  (1  m)i mE
0
i]
2
Since the loss function, L

, is concave in interest payments, the expected loss is
minimized by the maturity m = 0, which maximizes the variability of debt service.
The problem has a corner solution: at the beginning of period 0 the unlikely stabilizer
only issues one-period bonds.
8
Indeed, issuing short, and hoping for a favourable
realization of i, is the optimal strategy for a government with little chances to succeed
and low cost of failing.
9
It is \as if" the unlikely government were risk-lover; its only
hope is to be saved by a large fall in interest rates.
We have suggested an explanation for why credible stabilizations are accompanied
by a lengthening of debt maturity. In Section 2 we also reported evidence that the
maturity of the debt tends to increase with the conditional variability of interest
rates but there is nothing in our model which predicts such a behavior: maturity
lengthens if the stabilization is credible and shortens if it is unlikely, independently of
the variance of interest rates. We also observed a signicant decrease of debt maturity
asssociated with high long-term interest rate. While high interest rates may reect
investors' lack of condence in the stabilization attempt, this fact also needs to be
explained. Moreover, the concept of credibility, that we referred to, can be disputed:
a program may not be credible because the government resolution to carry out the
announced scal correction is not known to private investors. In the next section we
the distribution of i ensures that a government plans for a positive surplus even when K < a
2
.)
8
We do not consider the unrealistic case of m < 0 (and m > 2) where the government issues
short-term bonds and invests the proceeds in private assets.
9
This is because of the positive slope of the probability density function: a favorable shock to the
budget increases the probability of success by a larger amount than a negative shock of the same
magnitude reduces it.
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extend the analysis to allow for these eects. We present a standard reputation game
whose implications for the choice of debt maturity are consistent with the empirical
nding of Section 2.
4. Shortening maturity to signal the government's resolve
If private investors did not believe that the government will carry out the an-
nounced spending cuts, the interest rate on long-term bonds would be too high rela-
tive to the government's expectations of future interest rates. As stressed by Camp-
bell (1995), in such a situation a committed government may issue short maturities in
order to reduce the cost of debt servicing and, by so doing, it may signal its resolution.
Since short-term debt exposes the budget to roll-over risk, the lower the variance of
short-term rates and the higher the level of long-term rates, the greater the decrease
in debt maturity. Only when the uncertainty as to the outcome of the stabilization
is resolved and credibility is gained, the government will issue long maturity debt.
We introduce asymmetric information by assuming that the amount of spending
cuts and thus the level of spending in period 1 are not known to private investors. The
government can be of two types |dry or wet| depending on the level of spending
in period 1. A dry government (carries out larger cuts and) has a level of spending
in period 1, G
L
, which is lower than the level of spending, G
H
, of a wet government.
We assume that the mean of the period-1 interest rate, i, depends on the level of
spending; it is low, if the level of spending will be relatively low, or high if spending
will be relatively high. The model thus captures the relationship between govern-
ment spending and the rate of interest implicit, for example, in a closed economy
where agents have nite planning horizons. The higher interest rate faced by the
wet government in period 1 may also reect the expectation that the inability to
stabilize the debt may result in ination, or debt default. We dene by {s{ the dier-
ence between the expected period-1 interest rate of a government recognized as wet
compared with that expected by a government known to be dry. In principle, the
informational spread, s, is a function of the dierence in the probabilities of success
of the two governments. Making s endogenous, i.e. depend on the probabilities, p's,
of the two governments, would certainly desirable. However, this would prevent us
from deriving analytical solutions while adding very little to the understanding of the
problem. We prefer to keep the analysis simple.
The random interest rate faced by the wet government is distributed as:
i
W
 (E
0
i
W
; 
2
)
while the dry government faces
i
D
= i
W
  s  (E
0
i
W
  s; 
2
)
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More precisely, we assume that, except for the mean, the distributions of the interest
rates are identical across governments. We also assume that E
0
i
W
  s > 0.
The interest rate on long-term debt, E
0
i, reects the investors' assessment of the
government ability to cut spending. As investors are uncertain about the type of
government and thus about the mean of i, the relatively tougher government will pay
a premium on long maturities. A dry government may thus want to issue short-term
debt since such debt is renanced in period 1, after spending cuts are observed and
thus at a lower interest rate. For such a government it is worth borrowing short and
wait for period 1 when uncertainty is resolved and its type is revealed.
If high interest rates reect expected ination (and exchange rate devaluation),
price-indexed debt and foreign currency debt can play the same role as short-term
debt in avoiding the costs of asymmetric information. Such types of debt appear
to provide the ideal solution to credibility problems, since {if long-term{ they also
limit the risk of renancing. However, foreign currency debt exposes the govern-
ment budget to exchange rate risk which may arise, say, because of foreign monetary
disturbances (Bohn 1990a) and be undesirable for tax-smoothing purposes (Goldfajn
1995, Missale 1997). Price-indexed debt may also have undesirable eects on taxation
(Bohn 1988,1990b) and, more importantly, it can be costly to issue until a thick and
ecient market for such debt develops. The consideration of such costs, though not
explicitly modelled, has motivated our treatment of price-indexed debt and foreign
currency debt as short-term debt in the empirical analysis. In what follows we will
accordingly refer to them as short-term debt.
We limit our analysis to the case in which both governments are, on average,
successful, but (as shown in Figure 4) the sizes of the shocks which could cause them
to fail, 
W
and 
D
, dier. Both governments are better o the smaller is the variance
of interest payments, and thus prefer long maturities. However, if a dry government
is not credible, it will pay a premium on long maturities. It thus has an incentive to
distinguish itself from the wet type by shortening debt maturity.
We consider a class of separating equilibria whereby beliefs have the following
form: for maturities shorter than or equal to m
S
, the separating maturity, investors
expect the government to be dry; for maturities longer than m
S
they expect the
government to be wet.
The wet government will reveal itself if the expected loss, when it chooses to issue
only two-period bonds and is therefore identied as wet, is smaller than the expected
loss when it chooses a maturity equal to (or shorter than) m
S
, and is thus believed
to be dry, that is, if
E
0
L
W
(W;m = 1)  E
0
L
W
(D;m  m
S
)
where the superscript indicates the government type, while the rst term between
parenthesis denotes investors' beliefs. This inequality reduces to
(1 m)
2

2
 ms[2(a+G
H
+ E
0
i
W
)  ms]  0
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and is satised for
m  m
S


2
+ sx 
p
s
2
x
2
+ 
2
s(2x   s)

2
+ s
2
where x = a + G
H
+ E
0
i
W
. The incentive compatibility constraint of the wet gov-
ernment is satised for maturities shorter or equal to m
S
which lies in the interval
[0; 1] for any choice of the parameter values. The intuition for this result is as follows.
A short maturity brings no benet to a wet government, except for allowing this
government to disguise itself as dry. Since by mimicking a dry government interest
payments are saved only on long-term debt, such a gain disappears as the maturity
shortens. By contrast, the roll-over risk increases as the maturity shortens. It follows
there is always a short enough, but positive, maturity, 0 < m
S
< 1, which leads the
wet government to reveal itself. Consistently with the evidence presented in Section
2, the candidate separating maturity is increasing in the variance of interest rates and
decreasing in the level of the long-term interest rate. What is crucial for a separat-
ing equilibrium to exist is thus the willingness of the dry government to shorten the
maturity down to m
S
.
What are the options for the dry government? By choosing m
S
, it signals itself as
dry; otherwise it is undistinguishable from a wet type. In the latter case it chooses,
in the interval m
S
< m  1, the maturity which minimizes its loss, given that it is
expected to be wet. This maturity can be shorter than m = 1: a dry government
believed to be wet issues some short-term bonds since, by doing so, it can reduce
interest payments.
The dry government thus shortens the maturity to m
S
, and signals its type, if
the loss from doing so is smaller than the loss it experiences when it chooses a longer
maturity and is therefore believed wet:
E
0
L
D
(D;m
S
)  E
0
L
D
(W;m
S
< m  1)
where m is the maturity which minimizes the expected loss of the dry government
when it is believed wet; i.e. for maturities in the interval m
S
< m  1. The incentive
compatibility constraint of the dry government is satised if
(1  m
S
)
2

2
 (1  m)
2

2
+ m
2
s
2
+ 2 ms(z   s)
where z = a + G
L
+ E
0
i
W
. This condition shows that the dry government shortens
the maturity of the debt to signal its type if the cost of being perceived as wet |i.e.
the informational spread s| is high relative to the roll-over risk, 
2
. If this were not
the case, the dry government would prefer to issue long-maturity debt and pay the
higher interest rate.
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An intuitive sucient condition for a separating equilibrium is
10

2
 s(a+G
L
+ E
0
i
W
  s)

1 +
a+G
L
+ E
0
i
W
2(a+G
H
+ E
0
i
W
)  s

where the right-hand-side is increasing in s.
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Necessary conditions on the values of 
2
and s for a separating equilibrium to
exist, have been found by the help of numerical simulations, but are not reported for
reason of space. Results conrm that 
2
cannot be too large relative to s|otherwise
the dry government would prefer not to reveal itself, and limit the roll-over risk by
issuing a larger amount of long-term debt.
In cases where separating equilibria do not exist, i.e. when the roll-over risk is
high relative to the informational spread, pooling equilibria, where both governments
choose the same maturity, may exist. In the next Section we show that in a pooling
equilibriumdebt maturity is always longer than in a separating equilibrium. Although
the problem of multiple equilibria cannot be avoided, we can still show that the
pooling maturity, as the separating one, is increasing in the variance of interest-rate
shocks and decreasing in the informational spread.
4.1 High risk and low spread: pooling equilibria
We have shown that a committed government may issue short-term debt to re-
duce the expected cost of debt servicing and to signal its resolution to carry out the
stabilization program. Consistently with the evidence presented in Section 2, the sep-
arating maturity is increasing in the variance of interest rates and decreasing in the
long-term interest rate. However, separating equilibria do not exist when the infor-
mational spread is small relative to the roll-over risk. In this section we ask if, under
these circumstances, pooling equilibria exist, in which both governments choose the
same maturity.
We assume that agents have prior beliefs on the government they face: they expect
it to be dry with probability q, and wet with probability (1  q), so that, in a pooling
equilibrium, the forward rate is equal to
E
0
i
P
= q(E
0
i
W
  s) + (1   q)E
0
i
W
= E
0
i
W
  qs
10
The math is as follows. Since for any given maturity the expected loss is lower when the
government is believed dry than when it is believed wet, the above inequality is satised form = m
S
.
Then, noting that the loss from being believed dry is decreasing in maturity, a sucient condition, for
such inequality to be satised, is that the loss frombeing believed wet is increasing inm for maturities
longer than m
S
(i.e. that (1  m)
2
(
2
+ s
2
)   (1  m)2sz be increasing over the interval [m
S
; 1]).
Since such a loss is a second order polinomial in m, this is always the case if the unconstrained
minimum,m
M
is lower than m
S
. The unconstrained minimum is m
M
= (
2
  s(z   s))=(
2
+ s
2
)
11
Provided that a+G
L
+ E
0
i
W
> 2s, that we can safely assume.
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where E
0
i
P
is decreasing in the government reputation q, and in the informational
spread s.
Consider rst the maturities which minimize the loss functions of the two gov-
ernments given pooling expectations |more precisely, given that interest rates on
long-term debt are as in a pooling equilibrium: E
0
i
W
  qs. Clearly, the wet gov-
ernment prefers the longest possible maturity, m = 1, since with short-term debt it
would pay a higher interest rate when such debt is renanced and would be exposed
to roll-over risk. More generally, the loss of the wet government is decreasing in debt
maturity. On the contrary, the dry government nds it optimal to issue some short-
term debt, even in the absence of signalling eects, since such debt is renanced after
spending cuts are observed and, thus, at a lower interest rate. The maturity, m
D
,
which minimizes its loss function, given that interest rate on long-term debt are as in
a pooling equilibrium, is equal to
m
D
=

2
  s(1  q)(z   s)

2
+ s
2
(1  q)
2
It is then clear that a pooling equilibrium cannot be supported by pooling expecta-
tions for maturities longer than m
D
. If this were not the case, the wet government
would choose a longer maturity than the dry government, and a pooling equilibrium
would not exist.
Therefore, looking for expectations which can sustain a pooling equilibrium, the
candidate assumption is that the government is believed to be wet whenever it chooses
a maturity longer than m
D
. Then, it is easy to show that a pooling equilibrium,
where both governments choose the same maturity, m
D
, exists and is sustained by
such expectations, if m
D
satises the incentive compatibility constraint of the wet
government:
E
0
L
W
(Pooling; m
D
)  E
0
L
W
(W; m = 1)
which is satised if
(1 m
D
)
2

2
 m
D
qs[2(a+G
H
+ E
0
i
W
) m
D
qs] < 0
i.e. for
m
D
> m
W


2
+ sqx 
p
s
2
q
2
x
2
+ 
2
sq(2x  sq)

2
+ s
2
q
2
For a wet government the pooling maturity, m
D
, must be suciently long to insulate
the budget from roll-over risk and produce a substantial reduction in interest costs.
The incentive compatibility constraint of the dry government is also veried for
m
D
> m
W
. This follows from the fact that m
D
minimizes the loss of the dry gov-
ernment given pooling expectations and, for any given maturity, such loss is always
smaller than the loss it experiences when is believed to be wet.
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Writing the condition m
D
> m
W
as

2
  s(1  q)(z   s)

2
+ s
2
(1  q)
2
>

2
+ sqx 
p
s
2
q
2
x
2
+ 
2
sq(2x  sq)

2
+ s
2
q
2
shows that for a suciently high initial reputation, q, a pooling equilibrium exists in
which both governments choose m
D
. Intuitively, the maturity, m
D
, which represents
the optimal trade-o for a dry government between risk and interest costs, increases
in reputation, since a better reputation means a lower informational premium. On the
other hand, the maturitym
W
, which leaves the wet government indierent, decreases
in reputation, since long-term debt becomes relatively cheaper and, hence, a lower
share of it is needed to oset the same roll-over risk.
Obviously, other pooling equilibria exist when m
D
> m
W
. Any maturity m
P
,
such that m
W
< m
P
< m
D
can also be sustained as a pooling equilibrium by the
expectation that the government is wet when a maturity longer than m
P
is chosen,
provided that m
P
satises the incentive compatibility constraint of the dry govern-
ment. Formally, the loss from choosing the pooling maturity, m
P
, must be is smaller
than the loss a dry government obtains by choosing the maturity, m
M
, and being
believed wet:
E
0
L
D
(Pooling; m
P
) < E
0
L
D
(W; m
M
)
where m
M
is the maturity which minimizes the loss of the dry government when it is
believed wet |and which, for the reason explained above, could be smaller than 1.
This condition is veried for
(m
P
)
2
[
2
+ s
2
(1  q)
2
]  2m
P
[
2
  s(1  q)(z   s)] +m
M
[
2
  s(z   s)] < 0
which requires a suciently high initial reputation q.
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Parameter values for which the above conditions hold cannot be obtained ana-
litically. However, two important points can still be made without the need of nu-
merical simulations. First, the maturities m
S
, m
W
and m
D
|and thus any pooling
maturity| are all increasing in the variance of period-1 interest rates, 
2
, and de-
creasing in the informational spread, s. Second, if a pooling equilibrium exists, the
corresponding maturity is longer than the maturity m
S
which would induce the wet
12
When m
D
< m
W
, i.e. when reputation is low, a pooling equilibrium, where both governments
choose m
W
, could also exist, if the incentive compatibility constraints of the dry government were
satised with m
P
= m
W
. However, such an equilibrium would have to be sustained by the ex-
pectations that the government is wet whenever a maturity dierent from m
W
is chosen. This is
because a dry government, unlike a wet one, would never choose a maturity longer than m
W
(and
it would always choose a maturity shorter than m
W
). Since such an equilibrium must be sustained
by the expectations that the government is wet except for the choice of a single specic maturity, its
relevance is questionable. Under the same conditions other pooling equilibria with maturities longer
than m
W
may exist but they all are characterized by pooling expectations holding for one single
maturity.
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government to reveal itself. This follows by noting that m
S
is implicitly dened by
(m
S
)
2
(
2
+ s
2
)   2ms(
2
+ sx) + 
2
= 0. Substituting the value of m
S
in the loss
dierential of the wet government yields:
E
0
L
W
(Pooling; m
S
)  E
0
L
W
(W; m = 1) = m
S
s(1   q)[2x  (1 + q)m
S
s] > 0
which shows that m
S
does not satises the incentive compatibility constraint of the
wet government and therefore that m
S
< m
W
.
Therefore, when the roll-over risk, 
2
, is high relative to the informational spread,
s, so that a separating equilibrium does not exist, the dry government prefers to
issue long-maturity debt and incur the higher interest rate. In the resulting pooling
equilibrium, debt maturity is always longer than in any separating equilibrium arising
for lower values of 
2
relative to s.
5. Conclusions
This paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers at the
start of scal stabilizations. Such episodes are clear instances in which interest rates
on long-term bonds may be uduly high because of the lack of condence in the
stabilization program by private investors. This is a clear case where the informational
advantage of the authorities makes it possible to minimize the cost of debt servicing
by issuing short maturity or foreign currency or variable-rate debt.
We nd that governments, at the start of a stabilization, tend to issue a larger
share of short maturity debt the less credible is the program, and the lower is the
roll-over risk. Building on earlier ideas in the literature, and integrating optimal
taxation and asymmetric information, we develop a model of debt management which
highlights the role of the government's credibility and the risk associated with rolling
over short maturity debt.
We show that the debt issuing strategy that is observed in reality can be consistent
with optimal debt management. While this conclusion hinges upon the hypothesis
of asymmetric information between the government and private investors, we nd
that the attempt to confront theory with the actual behavior of debt managers is
promising. There is certainly a case for extending our work allowing for a more
accurate matching between stabilization announcements and debt issuing decisions.
We see this as the next step in our research project, which would, however, require
moving from a cross-country analysis to case studies of scal stabilizations.
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Data Sources and Denitions
Data on the composition by instrument of public debts are from national sources.
Usually they refer to the Central Government debt, but the rule is amended in a
few cases when data were available only for the General Government. Since for some
countries the composition of debt holdings of the monetary authorities is not available
we use a denition of debt which includes Central Bank holdings, a part from credit
lines.
Long-term debt is dened as the sum of xed-rate bonds and loans denominated in
the domestic currency with an initial term to maturity longer than 2 years. Choosing
a cut-o maturity of 2 years, instead of 1 year, allows to consider 2-year Treasury
Notes issued in Denmark and Germany and 18-months Treasury Bills for Spain as
short-term debt. (Austrian Treasury Bills can be extended after the initial 1-year
maturity but the interest rate becomes variable.)
Hence, bonds and loans denominated in foreign currency and debt bearing coupons
indexed to interest rates, to the price level or to the ECU exchange rate, have been
considered as short-term. The only exception to this criterium is Finland where
information on the share of variable rate debt (now about 15% of the total) is not
available. (Long-term Spanish loans of the 1970s have been considered as short debt,
since they were placed with the local banks at below-market interest rates.)
Extendable bonds and bonds with an option for early redemption (such as those
issued in Belgium and Italy) have been considered as long-term debt if the period
preceding the earliest possible maturity is longer than 2 years. Bonds bearing the
option to convert from xed-rate to variable-rate coupons (as those issued in France
in the early 1980s) have been considered as xed-rate debt since the option is not
exercised in case of falling interest rates.
Data on primary structural surpluses as a percentage of actual GDP have been
computed by normalizing structural balances (dened in terms of potential GDP)
and subtracting interest payments as a percentage of actual GDP. (The latter are
obtained as the dierence between overall nancial surpluses and the corresponding
primary surpluses). For the most recent period these data are published in the OECD
Economic Outlook. Revised series of the above variables starting in 1970s have been
kindly provided by Alexandra Bibbe of the OECD Economics Department, Public
Economics Division.
Long-term interest rates refer to secondary market yields to maturity of bench-
mark long-term government bonds, while short-term interest rates refer to 3-month
interbank rates since interest rates on Treasury bills are not always available.
Yearly data on short- and long-term interest ratesare from OECD, Economic
Outlook. Quarterly data on short- and long-term interest rates are from OECD Main
Economic Indicators and, when the OECD series is not available, from IMF Inter-
national Financial Statistics. The ratio of gross public debt to GDP is from OECD,
Economic Outlook.
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